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SIMMONS V. TUOMEYREGIONAL MEDICAL

CENTER: THE NEW SOUTH CAROLINA RULE ON
HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR MALPRACTICE OF

EMERGENCY ROOM PHYSICIANS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many hospitals have attempted to avoid medical malpractice liability for
certain high-liability services, such as emergency room operations, by engaging
independent contractors to perform these services.' Through the use of
independent contractors, hospitals have successfully prevented plaintiffs from
obtaining judgments against them by using the doctrine ofrespondeat superior.2
Although public policy once supported the idea that hospitals should be free
from liability for the malpractice of its physicians, this policy has changed with
the shift in the public perception and operation of hospitals.3 Today, various
theories have been used in an attempt to force hospitals to accept responsibility
for the torts of their physicians. In Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical
Center,4 the South Carolina Supreme Court decided this issue for South
Carolina.5 The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' decision that the
hospital should be held liable for the physician's malpractice. 6 However, the
supreme court declined to follow the court of appeals by imposing a
nondelegable duty on hospitals for the operation of an emergency room.' A
nondelegable duty imposes liability on the hospital in all circumstances
regardless of fault.s The supreme court refused to take this jump and instead
adopted a theory of ostensible agency' which renders the hospital liable when
it holds itself out as providing emergency services and the patient reasonably
looks to the hospital itself for emergency care.'"
ThisNote considers the effect the application of the ostensible-agency rule
in the hospital setting could have on hospitals, physicians, and patients. Part II

1. See H. Ward Classen, HospitalLiabilityfor Independent Contractors: Where Do We
Gofrom Here?, 40 ARK. L. Ray. 469,469-70 (1987).
2. See id.
3. See Diane M. Janulis & Alan D. Hornstein, Damned If You Do, DamnedIf You Don 't:
Hospitals' Liabilityfor Physicians' Malpractice,64 NEB. L. REv. 689, 690-92 (1985).
4. 341 S.C. 30, 533 S.E.2d 312 (2000).
5. Id. at 50-51, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
6. Id. at 50, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
7. Id. at 50-51, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
8. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, HospitalLiabilityfor Torts
of Independent ContractorPhysicians, 47 S.C. L. REv. 431,452 (1996).
9. Simmons, 341 S.C. at 50-51, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429(1965).
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provides background information regarding hospital liability and explores how
the historical notions have evolved into the rule applied today. Part II further
explains how public perception of hospitals has changed and describes how the
general operation of hospitals has developed into a for-profit business. The
court of appeals' decision imposing a nondelegable duty and the supreme
court's step back from this decision in its application of the ostensible-agency
theory is discussed in Part I. Finally, Part IV explains the effect that the
ostensible-agency rule may have on patients seeking to obtain judgments
against hospitals as well as the effect on hospitals themselves.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Independent ContractorException to RespondeatSuperior
Typically, under the doctrine ofrespondeat superior, masters are liable for
the torts of servants who are acting within the scope of their employment."
However, an important exception exists to this doctrine of liability with regard
to independent contractors. 2 When an employer does not exercise the requisite
degree of control over the employee, the employee is considered an
independent contractor, and liability for an independent contractor's torts is not
imputed to her employer. 3 Therefore, by establishing an independent

11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); see also Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957) ("The doctrine of respondeatsuperioris grounded on firm principles
of law and justice. Liability is the rule, immunity the exception. It is not too much to expect that
those who serve and minister to members of the public should do so, as do all others, subject to
thatprinciple and within the obligation not to injure through carelessness."); Sams v. Arthur, 135
S.C. 123, 128, 133 S.E. 205,207 (1926) ("An individual is charged with the consequences of an
act done directly by himself or indirectly by another at his command.").
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250 (1958); see also Albain v. Flower
Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038,1043 (Ohio 1990) ("'The fundamental rule generally recognized is that
the doctrine of respondeatsuperior is applicable to the relation of master and servant or of
principal and agent, but not to that of employer and independent contractor."' (quoting Miller
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 16 N.E.2d 447,448 (1938))).
13. See Ft. Lowell-NSS Ltd. P'ship v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 962, 966 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc)
('[T]he employer's lack of control over the manner in which the independent contractor
conducted the work rendered the undertaking essentially the contractor's enterprise rather than
the employer's."); Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443,445 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979)
("[lt is the 'degree of control' which is critical. When applying that test several factors may be
considered, including the type of occupation, the skill required, the method of payment, who
supplies the tools, etc."); Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1043 (reasoning that when an employer does not
retain control and is primarily interested in the ultimate result, an employer and independent
contractor relationship exists); Sampson v. BaptistMem'l Hosp. Sys., 940 S.W.2d 128,130 (Tex.
App. 1996) (clarifying that "[ilt is the right to control, not actual control, which is
determinative").
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss4/10
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contractor relationship, the traditional doctrine permits an employer to avoid
liability for an employee's torts. 4
Courts have held, however, that some duties are nondelegable, and
therefore the liability cannot be shifted to an independent contractor." Usually
these duties are such that "the responsibility is so important to the community
that the employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another."'" In these
situations a nondelegable duty is imposed to insure that there will be a party
financially able to compensate the injured party for harm incurred through
negligence in the undertaking. 7 Since the nondelegable duty doctrine is a type
of strict liability, which is liability without fault, there must be a very strong
public policy to support its application.'

14. See Hale v. Sheikholeslam, 724 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
hospital was not liable because the physician "was no more than an independent contractor" and
had no other "legal relationship" with the hospital); Ft.Lowell-NSS, 800 P.2d at 966 ("[I]t would
be unjust to hold an employer liable for the negligence of an independent contractor over whom
he had no control."); Arthur, 405 A.2d at 445 (stating that this general rule regarding
independent contractors has been applied in the hospital setting to absolve hospitals of liability);
Sampson, 940 S.W.2d at 130 (observing that a "hospital is not liable for the negligent acts of
independent physicians").
15. See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1383 (Alaska 1987) ("A non-delegable duty is
an established exception to the rule that an employer is not liable for the negligence of an
independentcontractor."); Ft.Lowell-NSS, 800 P.2d at967 (stating that anondelegable dutymay
"exist where the employer is under a higher duty to some class of persons"); Marek v. Prof'l
Health Servs., Inc., 432 A.2d 538, 542 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (recognizing the
nondelegable duty as an exception to the rule of no liability "dependent on public policy
considerations"). See generallyW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 71, at 511 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS] ("[T]he cases
of 'nondelegable duty' go further, and hold the employer liable for the negligence of the
contractor, although he has himself done everything that could reasonably be required of him.
They are thus cases of vicarious liability.").
16. PROSSERANDKEETONONTORTS, supranote 15, § 71, at 512; see Jackson, 743 P.2d at
1384 (stating that emergency room patients are "as deserving of protection as the airline
passengers" who are afforded a nondelegable duty by the airline); Beeck v. Tuscon Gen. Hosp.,
500 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Ariz. CL App. 1972) (referring to the importance of the hospital's duty to
the community); McWilliams & Russell, supra note 8, at 454. In Beeck v. Tuscon Gen. Hosp.
the Arizona Court of Appeals states:
Having undertaken one of mankind's most critically important and
delicate fields of endeavor,... the hospital must assume the grave
responsibility of pursuing this calling with appropriate care. The care and
service dispensed through this high trust, however technical, complex, and
esoteric its character may be, must meet standards of responsibility
commensurate with the undertaking to preserve and protect the health, and
indeed, the very lives of those placed in the hospital's keeping.
Beeck, 500 P.2d at 1157; see also Marek,432 A.2d at 542 (holding that the health care entity had
a nondelegable duty of care in reading its patients' x-rays). See generallyPROSSERAND KEETON
ON TORTS, supra note 15, § 71, at 511-12 (defining the character of nondelegable duty in terms
of the importance of the duty to the community and listing numerous examples ofnondelegable
duties).
17. See Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1968).
18. See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 8, at 453-54.
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B. Change in PublicPerceptionofHospitals
Originally hospitals were run by religious orders or governmental
agencies 9 and therefore were shielded from liability through the doctrines of
charitable and sovereign immunity. Charitable immunity Was based on the
public policy that by protecting charitable institutions from liability, the public
as a whole would gain the continued availability of their services.2 However,
the perception of hospitals as institutions in need of protection has changed as
hospitals have grown from charitable organizations to business enterprises, and,
as a result, the rule of charitable immunity has been abrogated.' The role that
hospitals play in society today spawns a new public policy which supports the
imposition of liability upon the hospital? 3
Since the days of charitable immunity, the relationships among hospitals,
physicians, and patients have changed significantly.24 The objectives of modern
hospitals are far more extensive than simply providing a facility for treatment. 2s
Today, "hospitals are run increasingly for profit by large national health
' Health care is now considered
corporations."26
an industry that is less personal
and more specialized than in the past.' Many patients do not have family

19. See Janulis & Hornstein, supranote 3, at 690.
20. See Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 27-28, 81 S.E. 512, 512-13 (1914).
21. See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 8, at 434-35.
22. See Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479,487,234 S.E.2d 873,87677 (1977). The first step toward abrogation in South Carolina occurred in Brown when the court
held that the hospital was not immune from liability for the tortious acts of the hospital or its
agents if "the injuries occurred because of the hospital's heedlessness and reckless disregard of
the plaintiff's rights." Id. The doctrine was then fully abrogated when the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that "a charitable institution is subject to liability for its tortious conduct the
same as any other person or corporation." Fitzer v. Greater Greenville S.C. YMCA, 277 S.C. 1,
4, 282 S.E.2d 230, 231-32 (1981). The Court of Appeals of New York expressly abrogated
charitable immunity in the hospital setting, stating that "[t]he test should be, for these
institutions, whethercharitable orprofit-making, as it is for every other employer, was the person
who committed the negligent injury-producing act one of its employees and, if he was, was he
acting within the scope of his employment." Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957).
However, the Simmons court noted that "[t]oday, the malpractice liability of hospitals classified
as charitable organizations or as governmental entities under the state Tort Claims Act is limited
by statute." Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 341 S.C. 32,41 n.3, 533 S.E.2d 312, 317 n.3
(2000) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-56-180 (Law. Co-op. & Supp. 1999) and S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-78-120 (Law. Co-op. & Supp. 1999)).
23. See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1384-85 (Alaska 1987); Beeck v. Tuscon Gen.
Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153,1157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d
788, 794 (Ill. 1993); Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8-9; Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr.,
628 N.E.2d 46, 51-52 (Ohio 1994); Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Wis. 1992);
McWilliams & Russell, supra note 8, at 436.
24. See Janulis & Hornstein, supra note 3, at 691-92.
25. See Beeck, 500 P.2d'at 1157; Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
26. Janulis & Hornstein, supra note 3, at 691.
27. See id. at 691-92.
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physicians and instead rely solely on the hospital for care.2" "[H]ospitals
increasingly hold themselves out to the public in expensive advertising
campaigns as offering and rendering quality health care services."29 Therefore,
"[a]s the role of the modem hospital has evolved, and as the image of the
modem hospital has evolved (much of it self induced), so too has the law with
respect to the hospital's responsibility and liability towards those it successfully
beckons." 30

Another change is that today hospitals are heavily regulated by the states.31
These regulations not only show how the perception of hospitals has changed,
but also support imposing a duty on hospitals to render non-negligent care.32
The stated purpose of South Carolina Code sections 44-7-110 through 44-7370, known as the State Hospital Construction and Franchising Act, is that
hospitals "will ensure safe and adequate treatment of persons in such
institutions. 3 The South Carolina Code further provides that "[e]ach hospital
must have a single organized medical staffthat has the overall responsibility for
the quality of medical care provided to patients," and that doctors who are
members of the staff must be licensed by the State Board of Medical
Examiners.3" Perhaps of most importance when considering the hospital's
liability for the operation of its emergency room is South Carolina's regulation
expressly requiring hospitals to provide emergency services.35
These South Carolina statutes and regulations evidence a public policy
which encourages hospital liability for torts occurring in the hospital
emergency room. Not only do these statutes purport to provide "safe and
adequate treatment" for patients, but they also require the hospital to maintain
an emergency room. 36 Therefore, if the regulations are considered together,
they provide support for the public policy that hospitals have a duty to afford
competent care to patients in their emergency room facilities. Accordingly, in
SYmmons, the South Carolina Supreme Court expressly rejected the hospital's

28. See id. at 692.
29. Kashishian,481 N.W.2d at 282 (stating hospitals spend billions of dollars in efforts
to market themselves as "full-care modem health facilities").
30. Id.
3 1. See, e.g., State Hospital Construction and Franchising Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-7110 to -370 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).
32. See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1382-83 (Alaska 1987) (holding that hospitals
have a duty to provide physician care in their emergency rooms based in part on the relevant
state hospital regulations); Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 330 S.C. 115, 122,498 S.E.2d
408, 411 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The change in public reliance and public perceptions, as well as the
regulations imposed on hospitals, has created an absolute duty forhospitals to provide competent
medical care in their emergency rooms.").
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
34. S.C. CODEANN. § 44-7-310 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
35. See 24A S.C. CDEANN. REGS. 61-16 § 613 (1992).
36. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976); 24A S.C.CODE ANN.REGs. 61-16

§ 613 (1992).
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contention that "regulations promulgated by the state Department ofHealth and
'
Environmental Control do not impose such a duty."37
1.

THE SIMMONS CASE

A. Background
The facts ofSimmons are typical for an emergency room negligence case.3"
McBride was treated at the Tuomey Regional Medical Center emergency room
for contusions received in a moped accident.39 Upon arrival at the emergency
room, his daughter, Simmons, signed a form consenting to treatment which
stated, "The physicians practicing in this emergency room are not employees
of Tuomey Regional Medical Center. They are independent physicians, as are
all physicians practicing in this hospital.'" However, Simmons claimed that
she believed the physicians were employees of Tuomey and that she did not
read the form because she was upset about her father's injuries.4' McBride was
treated and released by two attending emergency room physicians who failed
to treat a serious head injury that was visible on the back of his head.42 Both
physicians were employees of Coastal Physicians Services and were
independent contractors.43 The next day, McBride's condition worsened, and
he returned to Tuomey." Another physician diagnosed the injury as a subdural
hematoma, and McBride died six weeks later from complications caused by the
condition.45 Simmons, as personal representative for McBride's estate, brought
an action for medical malpractice against the physicians, Coastal Physicians
Services, and Tuomey Regional Medical Center."
A very similar situation arose in Cooper v. Tuomey Regional Medical
Center.47 Because Cooper and Simmons both raised the same issue, the
supreme court consolidated them on appeal.' John H. Cooper had chest pains
while driving.' Since he had suffered a heart attack before, he asked a friend

37. Simmons, 341 S.C. at 43, 533 S.E.2d at 318.
38. See Edwin L. Barnes, Jr., Note, Victims of Their Own Success? South Carolina
HospitalsNow Have an Absolute, NondelegableDuty to Provide Competent Emergency Room
Care, 50 S.C. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1999).
39. Simmons, 341 S.C. at 36, 533 S.E.2d at 314.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 330 S.C. 115, 117,498 S.E.2d 408-09 (Ct. App.
1998).
44. Simmons, 341 S.C. at 36, 533 S.E.2d at 314.
45. Id. at 36-37, 533 S.E.2d at 314-15.
46. Simmons, 330 S.C. at 116-17,498 S.E.2d at 408-09.
47. Cooper v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., Op. No. 98-UP-077 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 17,
1998).
48. Simmons, 341 S.C. at 36, 533 S.E.2d at 314.
49. Id. at 37, 533 S.E.2d at 315.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss4/10
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to drive him to the Tuomey Regional Hospital emergency room."0 Upon
entering the emergency room, Cooper told the receptionist that he was having
' However, Cooper then had to
a heart attack and asked for "immediate help."51
wait for one and a half hours before he saw a doctor, a delay which caused him
serious harm. 2 Unlike Simmons, Cooper never signed a form acknowledging
the independent contractor relationship. s However, Cooper,just like Simmons,
or indications that the physicians were not employees of
saw no signs
S4
Tuomey.
B. South CarolinaCourt ofAppeals'Decision
In Simmons v. Tuomey RegionalMedicalCenter,the South Carolina Court
of Appeals put an end to efforts by hospitals to insulate themselves from
55
liability by having their emergency rooms run by independent contractors.
The court of appeals applied a nondelegable duty to the operation of an
emergency room6--- quite a jump from the previous rule under which many
hospitals had found protection through the use of independent contractors.57
The holding was based almost completely on public policy. The court specified
three factors that have changed the policy regarding a hospital's liability for the
torts of emergency room physicians:" (1) emergency rooms are now, for
many, the health care provider of last resort;59 (2) regulations require hospitals
to provide emergency room services;' ° and (3) the public today views the
hospital as a "single-entity providing all of its medical services."'" The court
of appeals held that these factors give rise to policy concerns strong enough to
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

54. Simmons, 341 S.C. at 37, 533 S.E.2d at 315.
55. See Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 330 S.C. 115, 124,498 S.E.2d 408,412 (Ct.
App. 1998) ("Given the cumulative public policies surrounding the operation of emergency
rooms and the legal requirement that hospitals provide emergency services. We firmly believe
that hospitals must be accountable in tort for the actions of care givers working in their
emergency rooms.").
56. Seeid. at 124,498 S.E.2d at413.
57. See id. at 118, 498 S.E.2d at 409.
58. See Barnes, supra note 38, at 1069.
59. See Simmons, 330 S.C. at 120-21, 498 S.E.2d at 410-11 ("Few things are more
comforting in today's society than knowing that immediate medical care is available around-theclock at any hospital."). Further, in an emergency situation the patient is not in a position to
bargain for medical services. Id. at 121,498 S.E.2d at 411.
60. See id. at 121,498 S.E.2d at 411; Barnes, supra note 38, at 1069; see also supra text
accompanying note 34 (regarding the requirements that hospitals provide emergency room
services twenty-four hours a day).
61. Simmons, 330 S.C. at 121,498 S.E.2d at 411; Barnes, supranote 38, at1069-70 ("The
Simmons court acknowledged the commercialization of the industry and specifically cited
advertising, active solicitation of business, and other commercial efforts by hospitals as
contributing to the public's perception.").
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support the imposition of a nondelegable duty on the hospital's operation of an
emergency room.62 To impose a nondelegable duty, the public policy
supporting it must be exceptionally strong. 3 In the situation of Tuomey, the
court of appeals held that public policy supported the imposition of a
nondelegable duty."
A nondelegable duty is similar in effect to strict liability in that the
delagator will be held liable for the torts of the delagatee although the injury
occurred through no fault of the delagator and regardless of their relationship. 5
However, the nondelegable duty exception does not truly impose absolute
liability on the hospital. 6 "Although no fault of the possessor need be shown,
the negligence of the independent
contractor must be proven before liability
67
may attach to the employer."
The imposition of a nondelegable duty on hospitals would have farreaching implications on the quality of patient care, the patient's ability to
recover for malpractice, and the relationship between doctors and hospitals. 6
Under nondelegation hospitals may be forced to take control of their
emergency rooms, resulting in not only increased control over their operation,
but also increased profits for the hospital that were previously captured by
independent contractors. 69 However, among smaller hospitals, the result could
be quite the opposite, as the necessity of assuming control over the emergency
room may force them into merging or being bought out by larger
organizations. 70 However, since the Simmons court of appeals' decision is
based on "specific" public policy, the short-term effect of this decision will be
limited to the emergency room setting.7' Alternatively, "[t]he idea that hospital
liability should be determined by how hospitals, either individually or
collectively, are perceived by their users and the public could be given such
elasticity by the courts that hospital liability may quickly expand." 2 As
hospitals and physicians will be forced to re-evaluate the terms of their
relationships, the public-policy shift asserted by the court of appeals could
result in an expansion of hospital liability for malpractice occurring in other
areas of the hospital as well as the emergency room.73

62. Simmons, 330 S.C. at 120-24,498 S.E.2d at 410-12 ("(W]e believe that the operation
of emergency rooms is such an important activity to the community that hospitals should be
liable for the negligence of emergency room care givers.").
63. See supranote 16 and accompanying text.
64. Simmons, 330 S.C. at 124,498 S.E.2d at 412-13.
65. See McWilliams & Russell, supra note 8, at 453; see also Barnes, supranote 38, at
1063.
66. See Ft. Lowell-NSS Ltd. P'ship v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 962, 970 (Ariz. 1990) (en bane).
67. Id.
68. See Barnes, supranote 38, at 1078.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1079.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 1065.
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On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the result but took
a step back from imposing an absolute nondelegable duty on the hospital.74 The
supreme court instead based its holding on the theory of "ostensible agency""5
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 429 states:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform
services for another which are accepted in the reasonable
belief that the services are being rendered by the employer or
by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused
by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such
services, to the same extent as though the employer were
supplying them himself or by his servants.76
According to the court, for a plaintiff to hold the hospital liable under
section 429:
the plaintiff must show that (1) the hospital held itself out to
the public by offering to provide services; (2) the plaintiff
looked to the hospital, rather than the individual physician,
for care; and (3) a person in similar circumstances reasonably
would have believed that the physician who treated him or
her was a hospital employee.7
1.

The HospitalMust Hold Itself Out to the Public by Offering to
ProvideServices

The first element of the test, which requires that the hospital hold itself out
as providing emergency services, is relatively easy for a plaintiff to prove.
Courts have held that sufficient "holding out occurs 'when the hospital acts or
omits to act in some way which leads the patient to a reasonablebelief he is
being treated by the hospital or one of its employees." 79 InAdamski v. Tacoma
GeneralHospitalthe court found that the hospital held itself out as providing

74. See Simmons v. Tuomey Reg' Med. Ctr., 341 S.C. 32, 50-51, 533 S.E.2d 312, 322
(2000).
75. Id. at 51, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).
77. Simmons, 341 S.C. at 51, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
78. See Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979);
Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450, 453-54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Capan v. Divine
Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp.,
579 P.2d 970, 979 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
79. Capan,430 A.2d at 649 (quoting Adamski, 579 P.2d at 979).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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emergency services simply by providing emergency room care and neglecting
to inform the patient that the physician was not an agent of the hospital.8
However, several courts have stated that the hospital could avoid liability
simply by effectively putting patients on notice of the independent contractor
relationship." This causes problems as well because courts disagree as to what
action, sufficient to avoid liability, a hospital could take under section 429 to
make patients aware that its employees are not agents. Some courts have
neglected to mention notice at all and have simply stated that when a hospital
holds itself out as having emergency facilities, the meaningful notice
requirement is met and the hospital can be held liable.82 However, in Clarkv.
Southview Hospital& FamilyHealth Center 3 as well as Simmons, it was held
that "notice, to be effective, must come at a meaningful time."'" Both the Ohio
Supreme Court and the South Carolina Supreme Court explained that signs in
the emergency room informing patients of the physicians' independent
contractor status were not effective to give the patients the ability to choose
within a reasonable time."5 "Even if the patient understood the difference
between an employee relationship and an independent-contractor relationship,86
informing her of the nature of the relationship after she arrives is too late."
The notice should allow the patient to make an educated choice as to whether
to choose that hospital for care despite the independent contractor status of the
physicians." One commentator suggests that to limit potential liability,
hospitals should post notices in the waiting rooms stating the existence of the
independent contractor relationship and should take other measures, such as
indicating non-employee status on physicians' uniforms and requiring patients

80. Adamski, 579 P.2d at 979; see also Capan,430 A.2d at 649.
81. See Arthur,405 A.2d at 447 ("[U]nless the patient is in some manner put on notice of
the independent status ofthe professionals with whom it might be expected to come into contact,
it would be natural for him to assume that these people are employees of the hospital."); Capan,
430 A.2d at 650 (holding that the hospital's failure to alert the patient that the physicians were
not agents of the hospital was one factor in the court's determination that the hospital held out
the physicians as its employees); Adamski, 579 P.2d at 979 (holding that because "the plaintiff
was not advised to the contrary... ajury could find that the emergency room personnel were
'held out' as employees of the Hospital").
82. See Mduba, 52 A.D.2d at 453-54; Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676 P.2d 279,28283 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
83. 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994).
84. Id. at 54; see also Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 341 S.C. 32,47,533 S.E.2d
312, 320 (2000) (illustrating the trend against allowing hospitals to avoid liability through lastminute admission forms or emergency room signs); Sampson v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 940
S.W.2d 128, 135 (Tex. App. 1996) (observing that "posting signs in an emergency room will
rarely provide the patient with the ability to choose at a meaningful time").
85. See Clark,628 N.E.2d at 54 n.1; Simmons, 341 S.C. at 47, 533 S.E.2d at 320.
86. Sampson, 940 S.W.2d at 136.
87. Id.
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to sign a release indicating their knowledge of the independent contractor
relationship, to ensure that physicians are not held out as hospital employees. 8
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Simmons did not have to decide the
issue of adequate notice in relation to the test adopted under section 429
because this issue was to be determined by the trial court. 9 However, the
Simmons court did recognize the current trend ofcourts that have adopted some
form of apparent agency, stating that "hospitals will not be allowed to escape
liability by giving last-minute notice of independent-contractor practitioners
through admission forms or emergency room signs."' Therefore, although it
has been suggested that hospitals seeking to avoid liability should employ these
methods, it is probable that even these efforts will not be considered effective
as meaningful notice. Because the issue of whether a person has notice is a
question of fact for the jury,9 there may be no bright-line test to determine
what would constitute effective notice. While it is clear that simply posting
signs and having consent forms signed will not be sufficient, the courts have
provided little help as to what hospitals can realistically do to put patients on
notice that will be considered sufficient to avoid liability.
2. Plaintiffs Must Look to the Hospital Instead of the Individual
Physicianfor Care
In order to hold a hospital liable, a plaintiffmust also prove that she looked
to the hospital, not the individual physician, for care.' Some courts view this
as the "critical question" in determining whether a hospital maybe held liable.93
The requirement recognizes the changed status of the hospital in today's
society and the modem perceptions of the functions and duties of such a
business.' Previously, hospitals were considered places for physicians to treat

88. See Classen, supra note 1, at 502 (suggesting methods for hospitals to attempt to
effectively notify patients, but not indicating whether these methods are adequate).
89. See Simmons, 341 S.C. at 47-48, 533 S.E.2d at 320 (discussing the sufficiency of notice
in general without discussion of whether the notice given in that particular case, such as the
consent form, should be considered adequate).
90. Id.
91. See Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 795 (Ill. 1993) ("Whether a
person... is put on notice by circumstances, is ...a question of fact.").
92. See Simmons, 341 S.C. at 51, 533 S.E.2d at 322.
93. See, e.g., Smith v.St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676 P.2d 279, 282 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983)
("[T]he critical question is whether the plaintiff, at the time of his admission to the hospital, was
looking to the hospital for treatment of his physical ailments or merely viewed the hospital as
the situs where his physician would treat him for his problems." (quoting Grewe v. Mt. Clements
Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. 1978))).
94. See Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46,53 (Ohio 1994)
(addressing the element of representation and recognizing that "[i]n applying the traditional
elements in this way,... courts invariably recognize the status of the modem-day hospital and
its role in contemporary society"); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980) (relying on the change in perception and operation of modern hospitals to
determine that the patient looked to the hospital instead of the physician for care).
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their own patients. 9s However, times have changed; today hospitals hold
themselves out as providing physicians for needs such as emergency services,
and the public looks to the actual hospital instead of the specific physician for
such needs. 96 "[G]enerally people who seek medical help through the
emergency room facilities of modem-day hospitals are unaware of the status
of the various professionals working there."'' Therefore, unless the patient is
directed by her personal physician to go to the hospital or she goes to the
hospital and then requests a specific physician, the patient has looked to the
hospital itself for help. 98 In the absence of a pre-existing, patient-physician
relationship, the court will assume that the plaintiff was looking to the hospital
for help rather than to an individual physician, and the second element of the
test will be satisfied."
The Clark court has pointed out, though, that this element of the test is
purely subjective, and "[o]nce a plaintiff testifies that he or she 'looked to the
hospital' as opposed to the individual practitioner, a hospital defendant will
have almost no effective means to disprove the plaintiff's subjective state of
mind. '"' 0 However, as previously stated, the changed public policy respecting
hospitals supports the notion that, especially in emergency situations, patients
arelooking to the hospital as an entity to provide care, rather than the physician
alone.'

95. See Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 164,166 (Ga. 1987); Capan,
430 A.2d at 649.
96. See Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 361 S.E.2d at 164; Capan, 430 A.2d at 649.

97. Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
98. See id.
99. See id.; see also Richmond County Hosp., 361 S.E.2d at 166 ("A patient is likely to

look to the hospital, not just to a particular doctor he comes into contact with through the
hospital.")
100. Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 55 (Ohio 1994)
(Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
101. See id. at 53. The court summarizes the public's perception of modern-day hospitals
as follows:
As an industry, hospitals spend enormous amounts of money advertising
in an effort to compete with each other for the health care dollar, thereby
inducing the public to rely on them in their time of medical need. The
public, in looking to the hospital to provide such care, is unaware of and
unconcerned with the technical complexities and nuances surrounding the
contractual and employment arrangements between the hospital and the
various medical personnel operating therein.... Public policy dictates that
the public has every right to assume and expect that the hospital is the
medical provider it purports to be.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss4/10
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3. A Person in Similar Circumstances Must Have Reasonably
Believed That the Physician was a HospitalEmployee
Even after the plaintiff shows that she sought care from the hospital and
not from the individual physician, the plaintiff must still establish that she
should not have reasonably believed that the doctor was an employee of the
hospital. Several courts have held that "[p]atients entering the hospital through
the emergency room, [can] properly assume that the treating doctors and staff
ofthe hospital [are] acting on behalf of the hospital."'02 Patients should not be
bound by a contract between the physician and the hospital that they were not
aware of when they entered the hospital. 3 Whether the hospital adequately
notified the patient ofthe independent contractor relationship becomes critical
again in the analysis of this aspect ofthe test.' ° "[U]nless the patient is in some
mannerput on notice of the independent status of the professionals with whom
[the patient] might be expected to come into contact, it would be natural for
him to assume that these people are employees of the hospital."'0° Therefore,
absent some form of notice which the court deems sufficient, the
reasonableness of the patient's belief that the physician is a hospital employee
will be established through the support of the modem-day perception of the
hospital-holding itself out as a provider of medical services (including
emergency care).
IV. EFFECT OF OSTENSIBLE-AGENCY THEORY

Supporters of imposing a nondelegable duty on hospitals have pointed out
that if hospitals are not able to avoid liability by informing patients of the
independent contractor relationship when they enter the emergency room, they
will probably attempt to avoid liability by "more far-reaching general
notices ... contained in advertisements and other literature."'" Because
imposing the ostensible-agency doctrine could result in broader attempts by

102. Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450,453 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); see also

Gilbert Y.Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788,794 (111.1993) (explaining that the reasonable
expectations of the public are that the hospital's staff are actual employees of the hospital).
103. Mduba, 52 A.D.2d at 453; Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676 P.2d 279, 283 (Okla.
CL App. 1983); see also Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980) ("It would be absurd to require such a patient to be familiar with the law of respondeat
superior and so to inquire of each person who treated him whether he is an employee of the
hospital or an independent contractor.").
104. See Arthur v. St. Peter's Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
105. Id.; see also Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 794; Sampson v. Baptist Mem' Hosp. Sys., 940
S.W.2d 128,135-36 (Tex. App. 1996) ("The plaintiff's reliance upon the hospital's competence
has been demonstrated by her walking... into the emergency room. Simply informing her that
some doctors and staff have a different technical relationship with the hospital than the one she
expected does not lessen the reasonableness of her reliance upon the hospital." (quoting Clark,
628 N.E.2d at 54 n.1)).
106. Sampson, 940 S.W.2d at 136.
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hospitals to inform their patients and thus avoid liability, some courts have
decided to take the full leap and impose an absolute nondelegable duty on the
hospital.' 7 The imposition of a nondelegable duty avoids the various
notification schemes that hospitals doubtlessly will attempt, and instead places
the duty where many believe that it belongs-with the hospital.' 3
One problem with the ostensible-agency theory of the South Carolina
Supreme Court is that the notice issue is still basically unresolved.' Certainly,
under the ostensible-agency rule, hospitals will continue to make attempts to
inform patients by various notification methods which will lead to continued
litigation on this issue and the possibility that hospitals could still escape
liability. Some believe these attempts will be against public policy: Despite the
patient's knowledge of the relationship, they still are forced to rely on the
hospital
because "[t]here exists no other place to find immediate medical
110
care.
Aside from the fact that the ostensible-agency doctrine is unclear on the
issue of notice, this doctrine will, in effect, impose liability in the same
circumstances as the nondelegable duty theory."' Disregarding the possibility
of adequate notice under the ostensible-agency theory, both theories will hold
the hospital liable unless the independent contractor physician is personally
selected by the patient."' Under the ostensible-agency doctrine, "courts
virtually never dismiss a claim because the hospital dispelled the appearance
ofagency.... The non-delegable duty doctrine simply makes it explicit that
'the hospital bears vicarious liability .... ""', Certainly a valid argument exists
that both of these doctrines impose liability in practically the same situations,
the non-delegable duty approach may be more appropriate and efficient in
order to avoid further questions over the issue of notice.
When a patient seeks out a specific physician at the hospital, the hospital
is relieved of liability, but when a patient looks solely to the hospital for care,
the hospital will be forced to assume liability. However, one situation not
covered by this scheme occurs when a patient enters the emergency room for
treatment (relying on the hospital) and thereafter establishes a physician-patient
relationship with a specific physician (looking toward one physician)." 4 Two
cases have illustrated the possible results from a malpractice suit in this

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id.
See id.
See supranote 89 and accompanying text.
Sampson, 940 S.W.2d at 136.
See Ward v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y of America, Inc., 963 P.2d 1031, 1034

(Alaska 1998).

112. See id. at 1034-35.
113. Id. at 1035 n.5 (quoting Kenneth S. Abraham &Paul C. Weiler, EnterpriseMedical
Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L.REV.,381, 389
(1994)).
114. See Classen, supranote 1, at 489.
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particular situation. In Simmons v. St. ClairMemorialHospital,"sthe patient
was admitted to the hospital and was treated by the psychiatric physician on
call." 6 After his release from the hospital, the patient became a personal patient
of the physician until the patient committed suicide five months later. 7 The
decedent's parents sought to hold the hospital liable on the theory that the
physician was an ostensible agent of the hospital."' The court remanded the
case but found that the decedent could reasonably have looked to the hospital
for treatment, and therefore the hospital may have been liable." 9
Alternatively, in Porter v. Sisters of St. Mary,2 ' the court held that no
agency relationship existed between the hospital and the specialist who was
initially called in to treat the patient.'2 ' In Porter the patient entered the
emergency room, was treated by the specialist, and then consented to an
operation recommended by the specialist; the operation resulted in medical
problems." Although the surgery took place only a few days after the patient
was initially admitted to the emergency room, as opposed to the five months
that elapsed in the Simmons case, the Porter court held that no agency
relationship existed, and the hospital therefore could not be held liable." These
cases illustrate the potential problems with the ostensible-agency rule when the
patient initially looks to the hospital for emergency treatment, but then
develops a patient-physician relationship with the physician and is injured by
negligent acts not occurring in the emergency room."
Another potential problem with the ostensible-agency rule arises when the
patient admitted to the emergency room is unconscious and therefore is not
-aware of who is providing the treatment."z The court in Walker v. Winchester
1 addressed exactly this situation. 27 After Walker regained
MemorialHospital"
consciousness, it became known that he had a broken jaw that the emergency
room physicians failed to discover.'28 In denying the hospital's motion for
summary judgment, the court stressed the idea that the question of liability
should center around whether "the Hospital 'held out' the plaintiff's treating
physicians as its agents or permitted the doctors to represent to the plaintiffthat
they were agents of the Hospital."'" The court further stated that the fact that

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Simmons v. St. Clair Mem'l Hosp., 481 A.2d 870 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
Id. at 872.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 875.
756 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 674-75; Classen, supra note 1, at 491.
Porter,756 F.2d at 670.
Id. at 674-75.
Classen, supra note 1, at 492.
See id.
585 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Va. 1984).
Id. at 1329.
Id.
Id. at 1331.
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the patient was not conscious when he was admitted to the emergency room or
during his treatment weighed heavily against finding the hospital liable. 3
Walker presented one of the few situations in which the hospital may not be
held liable under the ostensible-agency theory because there is no way for an
unconscious patient to reasonably rely on the idea that the physician is a
hospital employee.'' The South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue,
explaining that "when a third person accepts such services on [an] injured
person's behalf and reasonably believes the services are being rendered to the
injured person by the independent contractor's employer," section 429 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts still applies.' However, although section 429
of the Restatement apparently may still apply when someone accepts medical
services on behalf of the injured person, the courts have not ruled on the
applicability of this section in a situation when no one actually accepts the
services on the injured person's behalf. 3
The reasoning applied in Walker could logically be extended to prevent
recovery against the hospital by a patient who simply did not have "full control
of his senses or have full comprehension of the circumstances."' 34 This
extension would relieve hospitals ofliability through application of ostensible
agency in a broad area of emergency room practice. Because many of the
emergency room malpractice cases involve unconscious patients and the trend
is toward hospital liability, ostensible agency may be a disfavored result
because it will allow hospitals a large window of non-liability simply because
the patient was unconscious. These patients are also the ones who may be most
in need ofprotection and most deserving of recovery for their injuries because,
as they were unconscious, they were allowed no choice about where they
received their treatment. The imposition of a nondelegable duty avoids these
problems with the application of the ostensible-agency theory because with a
nondelegable duty, hospitals would be held liable in all situations instead of
having a general rule of hospital liability with exceptions and uncertainties that
must be resolved by the courts.
V. CONCLUSION

Public policy supports the trend towards increased hospital liability. The
adoption of ostensible agency is a significant step towards absolute hospital
liability. Under this theory, as long as the hospital holds itself out by providing
an emergency room and the plaintiff reasonably looks to the hospital for care,
130. Id.
131. See Classen, supra note 1,at 493-94.
132. Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 341 S.C. 32, 51,533 S.E.2d 312, 322 (2000).
133. This situation may occur if a patient is brought into the emergency room alone and
unconscious, and the physicians render emergency medical treatment negligently. In that
scenario, the physician's treatment is performed under informed consent.
134. Classen, supranote 1, at 494 (stating that this possible application of the rule could
even prevent recovery by patients who did not speak the language ofthe emergency room staff).
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liability will be imposed. However, several aspects of this doctrine remain
unresolved. Hospitals will continue, and could possibly succeed, in developing
methods to adequately inform patients of the independent contractor
relationship of the physicians. There will also be issues regarding patients who
are brought to the emergency room unconscious who are conceivably not
actually looking to the hospital for care. Another concern with the future
application of this doctrine occurs when a patient is admitted to the emergency
room and is treated by an attending physician, but thereafter develops a
physician-patient relationship with that physician. When considering these
problems, the better approach would be to impose an absolute, nondelegable
duty as the South Carolina Court ofAppeals did. Imposing a nondelegable duty
would prevent future litigation over these unresolved issues, conform to the
trend of increased hospital liability, and protect those patients who are victims
of emergency room malpractice and may not be able to fully recover from the
individual physician.
Mary DameronStuart
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